





Volume 30, Issue 1 
  




Christian Hubert Ebeke  
CERDI-Université d''Auvergne Clermont 1 (FRANCE) 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between migrants remittances and the prevalence of child labor by using a large 
sample of developing countries. In particular, we investigate whether the inflow of remittances helps to offset the 
effects of financial constraints and income shocks on the prevalence of child labor. From on a sample of 82 developing 
countries (of which 31 are African) observed in the year 2000 and after taking into account the endogeneity of 
remittances, migration and financial development, we show that remittances reduce significantly the prevalence of 
child labor in developing countries characterized by weak financial systems and by strong income instability. However, 
we have not found a statistically significant relationship between adults emigration and child labor at home.
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This paper analyzes the contribution of migrants’ remittances on the reduction of child labor 
prevalence in developing countries. Using a large sample of countries (82) and after factoring 
in the endogeneity of migrants’ remittances, migration and financial development, our results 
suggest that remittances are robustly associated to a reduction in child labor. Moreover, we 
have found that remittances help to reduce child labor prevalence in countries characterized 
by a low level of financial development and with a high exposure to production per capita 
shocks.  
This is an important question for a number of reasons. Firstly, the problem of child labor is a 
crucial issue for economic development in the extent to which this strategy has irreversible 
consequences. Indeed, it is generally difficult for children who have early left school to return 
even if the economic situation has improved. Just as children who are forced to work several 
times a week while going to school may have more difficulty than others in the training. 
Several papers analyzing the factors of child labor in a cross country framework conclude that 
child labor is positively related to the level of poverty (Krueger, 1996) and to the importance 
of income shocks (Guarcello et al., 2003; Dehejia and Gatti, 2005; Beegle et al., 2006; Duryea 
et al., 2007). In contrast, financial development and integration to the global economy through 
trade and finance are factors of a reduction of child labor (Ranjan, 1999, 2001; Dehejia and 
Gatti, 2005; Shelburne, 2001; Cigno et al., 2002; Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006; Neumayer and 
De Soysa, 2005; Davies and Voy, 2009). However, these macroeconomic studies have in our 
knowledge, never at this time taken into account another dimension of economic globalization 
in  the  discussion.  Precisely,  it  appears  that  migration  and  remittances  are  absent  of  this 
macroeconomic literature on the sources of child labor prevalence in developing countries. 
The  literature  on  the  relationship  between  migration/remittances  and  child  labor  or  child 
human capital is essentially microeconometric (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Edwards and 
Ureta, 2003; Lopez-Cordova, 2004; Borraz, 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2006; Acosta et 
al., 2007; Yang, 2008b; Calero et al., 2009; Bansak and Chezum, 2009). These papers have 
focused  their  analyses  on  the  Latin  America  region  and  thus,  their  results  cannot  be 
generalized.  There  is  thus  a  necessity  to  provide  a  macroeconomic  approach  using 
international and comparable data to address this question. 
Secondly, this paper addresses the question of the contribution of migration and remittances 
on child human capital and child welfare. Remittances are one of the most visible dimensions 
of  the  current  globalization  and  recent  papers  have  provided  evidence  on  the  fact  that 
remittances might be countercyclical in the sense that they generally react to the economic 
situation at home (Yang, 2008a; Mohapatra et al., 2009). While the development potential of 
remittance flows is increasingly being recognized by researchers and policymakers, the effect 
of remittances on child labor at the cross-country level remains unexplored. Moreover, studies 
on  the  relationship  between  remittances  and  the  labor  force  participation  in  developing 
countries have generally focused on the effects of these flows on the labor participation of 
adults. The papers there point to a reduction in labor participation in remittances recipients’ 
countries  (Kozelt  and  Alderman,  1990;  Itzigsohn,  1995).  By  analyzing  the  effects  of 
remittances on the labor force participation of children, our paper is a first effort to try to fill 
this gap in the literature. 
There are several mechanisms through which migration and remittances might affect child 




might constitute for them an alternative source of funding which help to prevent the entry of 
children  in  the  labor  market.  This  idea  that  the  marginal  efficiency  of  remittances  on 
indicators of economic development increases with the shallowness nature of the domestic 
financial  system  has  been  put  forward  by  Giuliano  and  Ruiz-Arranz  (2009).  Remittances 
might  also  reduce  child  labor  prevalence  by  providing  insurance  for  households  against 
income shocks. Following the conclusion of recent papers which have shown that remittances 
received by households increase when countries are hit by shocks (natural disasters, conflicts, 
exchange rates), we can then expected that remittances will increase the ability of household 
to face shocks and thus reduce the propensity to send children into the labor market.  
The net effect of migration on child labor is the combination of the effect of remittances and 
the direct effect of adults’ emigration. While remittances might reduce child labor through the 
mechanisms describe above, adults’ emigration in contrast can increase the probability that a 
child  will  work  (Bansak  and  Chezum,  2009).  Indeed,  when  a  family  member  leaves  the 
household to work and send remittances back, there may be disruption due to the loss of a 
productive adult member of the family. As a result, children may be required to work to offset 
the market and non-market work performed by the missing adult. To take into account the fact 
that remittances’ effect on child labor might be affected by the direct effect of migration on 
child labor, we build our empirical models by allowing the presence of emigration rates of 
adults. Once more to our knowledge, this is the first paper which puts into the same cup, 
remittances and migration and their respective impacts on child labor using comparable and 
international data sets.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the construction of the 
econometric  model,  the  presentation  of  the  variables  used  in  this  article  and  estimation 
method. Section 3 discusses the results. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The  first  model  is  constructed  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  the  marginal  efficiency  of 
remittances  on  child  labor  reduction  increases  with  the  level  of  financial  constraints  in 
developing countries. The second model is devoted to the insurance effect of remittances in a 
context of production volatility. In each of these two equations, we always control for the 
direct impact of adults’ migration on child labor. We then extend the models of Edmonds and 
Pavcnik  (2006),  Dehejia  and  Gatti  (2005)  and  Davies  and  Voy  (2009)  by  introducing 
migration and remittances variables.  
2.1  An  econometric  equation  of  the  relationship  between  remittances,  financial 
development and child labor 
We specify the following equation: 
i i i i i i i i i M FD FD R R X cl ε µ φ γ γ γ β α + + + + ∗ + + ′ + = 3 2 1           (1) 
where  cl,  R,  FD,  M  and  i µ   represent  respectively  the  rate  of  prevalence  of  child  labor, 
remittances as share of GDP, private credit ratio, emigration rate and regional dummies. i is 
the country index and  i ε  the error term. The vector X contains the traditional determinants of 





1, trade openness, rural population, agricultural value added share, size of government 
(government consumption) and a dummy variable, equal to 1 if, as of 1995 a country had 
signed the ILO Convention 138 establishing minimum working ages
2. We also control for the 
initial level of child labor in each countries (level of child labor in 1960) as well as shocks 
variables. The rural population, agricultural value added share and the volatility of GDP per 
capita are expected to be positively related to child labor while trade openness should reduce 
it following the results of previous works (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006, Dehejia and Gatti, 
2005). We also expect that child labor rates will be low in countries with high levels of 
government spending. GDP per capita, trade openness, rural population, agricultural share, 
government size, private credit ratio and child labor data are drawn from World Bank tables 
(World Development Indicators, 2004, 2008). 
To measure economic volatility we follow Flug et al. (1998) and Dehejia and Gatti (2005) and 
construct the standard deviation of annual per capita income growth rates in the previous 5 
and 10 years. We expect that more children enter the labor force when economic volatility is 
high. Our hypothesis is that  0 1 < γ  and  0 2 > γ so that the impact of remittances  i FD 2 1 γ γ +  on 
child labor is more negative at low levels of financial development.  
2.2.  An  econometric  equation  of  the  relationship  between  remittances,  economic 
volatility and child labor 
Do migrants’ remittances dampen the effect of economic volatility on the prevalence of child 
labor? In order to answer this question, the following model is specified: 
i i i i i i i i i M Sh Sh R R X cl ε µ φ θ θ θ β α + + + + ∗ + + ′ + = 3 2 1           (2) 
where  i Sh  refers to the measure of economic volatility in each country. The model includes 
the same control variables as before and we test the hypothesis that remittances increase the 
ability  of  households  to  face  income  shocks.  Empirically,  we  test  that  the  coefficient 
associated to the interaction between remittances and either indicators of shocks (volatility in 
the previous 5 or 10 years) is statistically negative. Put differently, we verify that the impact 
of remittances  i Sh 2 1 θ θ +  on child labor is more negative at high levels of volatility. 
2.3 Child labor, remittances, financial development and migration data 
We measure the extent of child labor as the percentage of the population in the 10–14-year-
old age range that is actively engaged in work. These data were compiled by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) and are available at 10-year intervals, beginning in 1950 for 172 
countries. “Active population” includes people who worked (for wage or salary, in cash or in 
kind, as well as for family unpaid works) for at least 1 hour during the reference period 
(International Labor Organization, 1996). The structure of the data does not allow us to infer 
the intensity of child labor, so we cannot distinguish between light work (which some might 
argue is beneficial for adolescents) and fulltime labor, which might seriously conflict with 
human capital accumulation. Moreover, like most official statistics on child labor, these data 
                                                 
1 We allow for the (log) income to enter the specification nonlinearly because the effects of income on child 
labor likely differ across poor and rich countries. 





are likely to suffer from underreporting, because work by children is illegal or restricted by 
law in most countries, and children often are employed in agriculture or the informal sector. 
These problems notwithstanding, the ILO data have the advantage of being carefully adjusted 
on  the  basis  of  internationally  accepted  definitions,  thereby  allowing  cross-country 
comparisons  over  time  (Ashagrie,  1993).  Child  labor  data  for  year  2000  are  drawn  from 
World Bank Development Indicators (2004). 
Remittances data are drawn from the World Bank database (World Development Indicators, 
2008). This variable includes three categories: “unrequited transfers” which refer to money 
sent by migrants to family and friends to the home country, “migrant transfers” which are 
equal to the net worth of the migrants (considered here as individual’s change of residence for 
at least one year) and finally “compensation of employees” which represent funds sent back 
by  temporary  workers  who  work  abroad  for  less  than  a  year.  This  database  provides 
information for a lot of countries and over a long period. We use in our estimation the ratio of 
remittances received by the home country on its GDP.  
Financial development is measured as the ratio of domestic credit to private sector provided 
by deposit banks. Series are drawn from the database compiled annually by Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt  and  Levine  for  the  World  Bank.  The  choice  of  this  variable  to  proxy  the  level  of 
financial development is justified by two important reasons. On the one hand, the dimension 
of financial intermediation in which we are interested in is the capacity of banks to provide 
funds  to  households  or  firms.  On  the  other  hand,  the  variables  retained  as  exogenous 
instruments for financial development are more pertinent if financial development is proxied 
by the credit ratio. 
Data on emigration rates come from Docquier et al. (2009) and consist in the emigration rates 
of  each  developing  country  of  individuals  aged  25+  to  OECD  in  2000.  More  precisely, 
emigration rates are defined as the ratio of the stock of migrants aged 25+ observed in 2000 to 
the native population with the same age. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the estimations. 
Data concern the year 2000, year for which data on emigration rate of individuals aged 25+ to 
OECD countries are available.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  Std-dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
           
Prevalence of child labor  82  12.89561  14.50189  0  51.13 
Remittances  82  3.344394  4.430152  0.014511  21.79848 
Private credit ratio  82  27.93375  29.20471  3.838443  177.9058 
GDP per capita growth volatility (5y)  82  2.910967  1.989611  0.356830  9.109325 
GDP per capita growth volatility (10y)  81  5.138843  4.086954  0.583939  20.76032 
Emigration rate of individuals aged 25+  82  4.093543  5.789015  0.067604  34.94054 
GDP per capita  82  1650.143  1756.961  120.1141  8270.758 
Trade openness  82  22.73487  9.185678  3.785335  49.22613 
ILO Convention 138  82  0.243902  .4320773  0  1 
Rural population (%)  82  51.8561  20.53585  8.9  87.9 
Prevalence of child labor in 1960  82  24.01329  18.96497  0  79.4 
Agricultural value added share (% GDP)  82  21.7405  13.2383  2.82874  53.3030 
Government size (% GDP)  82  22.7348  9.18567  3.78533  49.2261 
           




2.4. Identification strategy 
We  propose  several  instrumental  variables  for  remittances,  international  migration  and 
financial development following the recent literature on these respective topics. 
Remittances 
The first instrument is the cost to send $200 remittances to each developing country. This 
instrument  is  expected  to  be  negatively  correlated  to  the  volume  of  remittances  received. 
Freund  and  Spatafora  (2008)  have  addressed  this  issue  using  data  collected  from  official 
money  transfers  operators.  They  also  have  estimated  a  negative  association  between 
remittances  and  the  existence  of  dual  exchange  rate  in  a  country.  This  binary  indicator 
specifies if a country has more than one exchange rate that may be used simultaneously for 
different purposes and/or by different entities. It comes from the IMF's Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The second instrumental variable is thus 
a dummy variable for dual exchange rate.  
Emigration of individuals aged 25+ 
Several microeconometric papers on the impact of migration on child labor have put forward 
the issue of the endogeneity of migration (Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Borraz, 2005; Acosta, 
2006; Calero et  al., 2009).  In this paper, international migration is instrumented by three 
variables of geographical and cultural proximity between the country of origin and the OECD 
area.  Following  Docquier  et  al.  (2009)  and  Abdih  et  al.  (2008),  we  retain  as  exogenous 
determinants of emigration rates: the log of the distance between the departure point and the 
OECD area, the log of coastal area of a country (defined as the log ratio of the area within 100 
KM from a sea or an ocean to the total area of the country) and finally, a dummy variable 
which  takes  one  when  the  same  language  is  shared  between  one  country  and  the  OECD 
countries. Coastal area data are drawn from the works of Gallup et al. (1999), distance and 
language  are  taken  from  a  study  of  the  Centre  d’études  prospectives  et  d’informations 
internationales-CEPII. 
Private credit ratio 
Two variables are chosen as instruments for the banks’ private credit ratio. They are creditors 
rights and binary variable on the existence of public (i.e., government-owned) and private 
credit registries in different countries. These registries collect information on credit histories 
and current indebtedness of various borrowers and share it with lenders. Djankov et al. (2007) 
have shown that the level of creditors’ right is an important determinant of private credit. In 
fact, when lenders can more easily force repayment, grab collateral, or even gain control of 
the firm, they are more willing to extend credit. They have also shown that what matters for 
lending is information. When lenders know more about borrowers, their credit history, or 
other lenders to the firm, they are not as concerned about the lemons problem of financing 
nonviable projects and therefore extend more credit.  
Interaction terms 
We need also to take into account the endogeneity of remittances crossed with private credit 
and remittances crossed with volatility. The first variable is instrumented by the product of 
each instrument of remittances by each instrument of private credit. The second variable is 




following Calero et al. (2009), we make the assumption that economic volatility is orthogonal 
to the errors terms in each model of child labor. 
 
3. RESULTS 
We  present  the  results  of  the  impact  of  remittances  on  child  labor.  The  estimator  of  the 
generalized method of moments is preferred than the traditional 2SLS estimator because the 
first is more efficient in the case of over-identified models and non spherical errors terms.  
3.1. Remittances, financial constraints and the prevalence of child labor 
The results of the estimation of the model (1) are presented in Table 2 in Appendix. In the 
first  column,  we  estimate  the  models  without  interaction  terms.  The  results  of  these 
preliminary  empirical  specifications  suggest  that  remittances  reduce  significantly  the 
prevalence  of  child  labor  in  recipients’  countries.  While  the  coefficient  associated  to  the 
emigration variable appears to be positive, the impact is not statistically significant. The sign 
of the coefficients of control variables is as expected. Now we turn to the estimation of the 
heterogeneous impact of remittances. In column 2, we add as control variable, the  standard 
deviation of GDP per capita growth rate in the previous 5 years while in column 3, we present 
results obtained when volatility is computed from the 10 previous years. Before we discuss 
the results of the impact of remittances, we need to tell something about the instrumentation 
equations in these specifications. Table 3 in Appendix presents the instrumentation equation 
associated to each of endogenous regressors and each specification of the structural model (1). 
The first four columns of Table 3 present the instrumentation equations derived from the 
specification in column 2 of Table 2. The last four columns of Table 3 are devoted to the 
results of the instrumentation equation derived from the specification in column 3 of Table 2. 
Table 2 presents also diagnostic tests associated to first stage models. As we can see from 
columns 2 to 3, our instruments are significantly associated to endogenous regressors given 
the  low  probability  of  the  F-test  statistics  in  the  first  stage  (see  Table  2);  so  there  is  no 
presumption of weak instrument problems in these models. Moreover, the over-identification 
tests (Hansen OID test) do not reject the hypothesis that our instruments are not correlated 
with the error terms of structural equations. 
We  now  turn  to  the  discussion  of  results  derived  from  the  estimation  of  the  structural 
equations. We notice that all explanatory variables have the correct sign and some of them are 
statistically significant. We observe for example that the quadratic relationship between GDP 
per capita and child labor prevalence is confirmed by our data (column 2). Indeed, this result 
had been previously found by Dehejia and Gatti (2005) and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006). 
Initial conditions are also a good predictor of child labor given the positive and significant 
coefficient of child labor in 1960. The rural population and agricultural value added shares are 
also positively related to the prevalence of child labor whereas the ratification of ILO 138 
Convention in 1995 is negatively associated to child labor in 2000 although the coefficient is 
not statistically significant. Trade openness is no longer significant to explain child labor 
prevalence  in  our  model,  perhaps  because  we  have  already  control  for  its  specific 
transmission channel, precisely per capita income (See Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2006). We 





When  we  turn  to  our  variables  of  interest,  we  observe  that  remittances  and  remittances 
crossed with the private credit are significantly associated to the prevalence of child labor and 
their coefficients exhibit opposite signs. Moreover, the effect of the private credit ratio on 
child  labor  is  clear  and  negative.  These  results  hold  whatever  the  measure  of  economic 
volatility included in the models (columns 2 and 3). These results suggest that the marginal 
efficiency of remittances on child labor reduction increases with the importance of credit 
constraints faced by households in countries. To ensure that the overall impact of remittances 
on child labor is statistically significant, we perform an F-test of the joint significance of 
coefficients associated to remittances and remittances crossed with private credit ratio. The 
results of this test in Table 2 confirm that the coefficients are jointly significant. We then can 
make some basics simulations in the basis of these results. Perhaps a  better sense of the 
quantitative significance of the impact of migrants’ remittances can be obtained from the 
following calculation based on the results of column 2 for example. A one standard-deviation 
increase in remittances ratio (4.43) is associated with a 38% decrease in child labor relative to 
the mean (12.90%) for a developing country with a credit ratio which corresponds to the 25th 
percentile of the distribution of the variable (9.97%)
3. 
While remittances appear to be negatively associated to child labor in developing countries, 
we notice from results of columns 1 to 3 that adults’ emigration is not statistically related to 
the international prevalence of child labor. However, the coefficient of this variable is positive 
although not significant. 
3.2. Remittances, economic volatility and the prevalence of child labor 
The results of the estimation of the model (2) are presented in Table 2. Two models are 
estimated depending on the indicator of economic volatility retained. In the fourth column, we 
present the results when volatility is measured as the standard deviation of GDP per capita 
growth  rate  in  the  previous  5  years.  Column  5  presents  the  results  when  volatility  is 
constructed on the basis of 10 previous years. The corresponding instrumentation equations 
are presented in Table 4 in Appendix. Moreover, the diagnostic tests associated to first stage 
analysis confirm the validity of our instrumental strategy. We notice that our instruments are 
significantly  related  to  the  endogenous  regressors  given  the  low  values  taken  by  F-test 
probabilities in the first stage regressions. Moreover, the test of over-identification restrictions 
suggests an absence of correlation between our instruments set and the error terms in the 
structural equations. 
Regarding the control variables, the U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and child 
labor  is  confirmed  once  again  (column  5).  Rural  population  and  agricultural  value  added 
shares are factors of child labor. One of the most important results is the fact that volatility is 
positively and significantly associated to child labor. This result had been previously found by 
Dehejia  and  Gatti  (2005)  in  a  cross  country  study  and  by  Calero  et  al.  (2009)  in  a 
microeconometric study for Ecuador. We notice also that recent economic shocks (volatility 
measured using data for the 5 previous years) contribute the most in the expansion of child 
labor than old shocks (instability using the 10 previous years). 
From the results of columns 4 and 5, the insurance role played by remittances is confirmed 
empirically.  Indeed,  the  interaction  terms  of  remittances  crossed  with  either  indicators  of 
economic  volatility  is  statistically  significant  and  negative.  This  suggests  that  remittances 
                                                 




increase  the  ability  of  households  to  face  shocks.  The  F-test  of  the  joint  significance  of 
additive and interactive terms with shock variable leads to the conclusion that the total impact 
of remittances on child labor is statistically significant. On the basis of results obtained in 
column  4  for  example,  a  one  standard-deviation  increase  in  remittances  ratio  (4.43)  is 
associated with a 22% decrease in child labor relative to the mean (12.90%) for a developing 
country with a volatility which corresponds to the 75th percentile of the distribution of the 
variable (4.05%)
4. 
Once more, even in this specification, migration is not robustly associated to child labor. 
However, the coefficient is positive and in conformity with the previous results of Bansak and 
Chezum (2009) from micro data for Nepal. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Workers’ remittances, flows received from migrant workers residing abroad, have become the 
second largest source of external finance for developing countries in recent years. In addition 
to their increasing size, the stability  of these flows despite  financial crises and  economic 
downturns  make  them  a  reliable  source  of  funds  for  developing  countries.  While  the 
development potential of remittance flows is increasingly being recognized by researchers and 
policymakers,  the  effect  of  remittances  on  child  labor  at  the  cross-country  level  remains 
unexplored. This paper is a first effort to try to fill this gap in the literature. We have tested 
the  hypothesis  that  remittances  are  more  effective  in  child  labor  reduction  when  the 
constraints faced by households of these countries are high. On the basis of a large sample of 
developing countries observed in the year 2000, we have shown that the marginal impact of 
migrants' remittances on child labor increases with the levels of financial constraints and the 
intensity of income shocks. These results are robust to the correction of endogeneity bias 
arising from omitted factors, reverse causation, and measurement error in our variables of 
interest.  
Our results suggest that all strategies to facilitate the inflow of remittances in these countries 
are important for the accumulation of child human capital and a reduction in the prevalence of 
child labor. Such policies have distinct advantages over other remedies. Compared with legal 
restrictions and direct bans, it can decrease child labor without lowering household welfare, 
and it is arguably a simpler goal than general economic development and can have a more 
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Table 2: Impact of migration and remittances on Child Labor 
Dependent variable :  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Prevalence of Child Labor : Children aged 10-14           
           
Remittances (% GDP)  -0.466*  -1.517***  -1.665***  1.081*  1.669** 
  (-1.938)  (-3.280)  (-3.756)  (1.894)  (2.216) 
Remittances*Private credit ratio    0.0401***  0.0500***     
    (2.615)  (3.415)     
Remittances*GDP per capita growth volatility (5years)        -0.427*   
        (-1.812)   
GDP per capita growth volatility (5years)    0.337    1.516*   
    (1.166)    (1.664)   
Remittances*GDP per capita growth volatility (10years)          -0.232** 
          (-2.156) 
GDP per capita growth volatility (10years)      0.0965    0.770* 
      (0.614)    (1.816) 
Emigration rates of individuals to OECD (aged 25+)   0.280  0.196  0.0773  0.127  -0.0487 
  (1.506)  (0.720)  (0.266)  (0.319)  (-0.184) 
Private credit ratio (%GDP)  -0.00357  -0.115**  -0.136**  -0.0150  -0.0171 
  (-0.130)  (-2.019)  (-2.362)  (-0.335)  (-0.404) 
Initial level of child labor  0.446***  0.413***  0.408***  0.339***  0.421*** 
  (7.902)  (6.561)  (5.821)  (3.872)  (5.637) 
GDP per capita (log)  -20.16**  -10.26  -6.860  -4.206  -18.28* 
  (-2.385)  (-1.125)  (-0.723)  (-0.375)  (-1.772) 
(GDP per capita (log))²  1.236**  0.708  0.550  0.370  1.346** 
  (2.236)  (1.171)  (0.847)  (0.477)  (2.045) 
Rural Population (%)  0.0892*  0.260**  0.319***  0.145**  0.0335 
  (1.769)  (2.438)  (2.922)  (2.209)  (0.469) 
Agricultural value added share (% GDP)  0.0127  0.173*  0.206**  0.298*  0.278* 
  (0.152)  (1.744)  (2.041)  (1.940)  (1.767) 
Government consumption (% GDP)  -0.00668  -0.205**  -0.244***  -0.171**  -0.131* 
  (-0.107)  (-2.517)  (-3.215)  (-2.256)  (-1.921) 
Trade openness  -0.00506  0.0123  0.0135  -0.0544  -0.00789 
  (-0.155)  (0.333)  (0.346)  (-0.851)  (-0.162) 
ILO Convention 138    -0.379  -0.0776  -0.502  -0.339 
    (-0.280)  (-0.0574)  (-0.243)  (-0.204) 
Constant  75.48**  30.53  13.14  3.694  53.23 
  (2.278)  (0.819)  (0.358)  (0.0870)  (1.262) 
Observations  82  82  81  82  81 
Centered R²  0.911  0.855  0.814  0.894  0.900 
Joint significance of remittances variables (p-value)    [0.0035]  [0.000]  [0.100]  [0.071] 
 Remittances instrumentation F-stat (p-value)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
 Remittances*Private credit instrumentation F-stat (p-value)    [0.037]  [0.023]     
 Remittances*Volatility (5y) instrumentation F-stat (p-value)        [0.530]   
 Remittances*Volatility (10y) instrumentation F-stat (p-value)          [0.077] 
 Private credit ratio instrumentation F-stat (p-value)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.023]  [0.033] 
 Emigration to OECD instrumentation F-stat (p-value)  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
 Hansen OID p-value  [0.158]  [0.435]  [0.591]  [0.731]  [0.537] 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. The GMM estimator has been used in all specifications. Endogenous explanatory variables are: 
remittances,  remittances*private  credit,  remittances*GDP  per  capita  growth  volatility,  the  private  credit  ratio,  and  emigration  rate. 
Remittances are instrumented by the cost to send $200 to each country and by a dummy variable for the existence of dual exchange rate. 
Private credit ratio is instrumented by the index of creditors’ right and by a binary variable on the existence of public (i.e., government-
owned) and private credit registries. Emigration rate of individuals aged 25+ to OECD is instrumented by the log distance between each 
country and the OECD area, by a binary variable of common language shared with at least one member of the OECD area and finally by the 
ratio of coastal area to the total area. Endogenous interactive variables are instrumented by the product of instruments of each endogenous 






Table 3: Instrumentation equations related to the estimation of model (1) 
Variables  R  FD  M  R*FD  R  FD  M  R*FD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Dual exchange rates  -3.157  0.00174  5.378  30.76  -3.231  -0.640  5.222  33.15 
  (-1.602)  (0.000)  (1.581)  (0.261)  (-1.393)  (-0.0312)  (1.503)  (0.245) 
Dual exchange rates*Information  2.246  20.86  -0.614  68.18  3.263  25.04  0.255  163.8 
  (0.684)  (1.289)  (-0.218)  (0.492)  (1.010)  (1.389)  (0.0943)  (1.202) 
Dual exch. rates*Creditors’ rights  0.357  -13.80*  -2.861**  -62.03  -0.0412  -15.27*  -3.174**  -99.06 
  (0.282)  (-1.906)  (-2.283)  (-0.967)  (-0.0297)  (-2.005)  (-2.434)  (-1.314) 
Cost to send $200  -0.563*  -0.287  -0.511  -4.732  -0.594*  -0.468  -0.535  -10.95 
  (-1.677)  (-0.103)  (-1.123)  (-0.232)  (-1.773)  (-0.164)  (-1.172)  (-0.564) 
Cost to send $200*Information  0.196  3.368  0.166  12.74  0.209  3.303  0.156  14.08 
  (0.665)  (1.315)  (0.445)  (0.817)  (0.705)  (1.246)  (0.414)  (0.906) 
Cost to send $200*Creditors’ right  0.261  -2.560**  0.424**  -1.140  0.274*  -2.476**  0.433**  2.441 
  (1.613)  (-2.292)  (2.122)  (-0.160)  (1.787)  (-2.253)  (2.094)  (0.327) 
Information  -2.847  -43.18  -3.747  -151.5  -3.336  -42.55  -3.735  -188.6 
  (-0.698)  (-1.161)  (-0.679)  (-0.791)  (-0.810)  (-1.101)  (-0.662)  (-0.988) 
Creditors’ rights  -3.940*  44.31***  -5.367*  38.83  -4.166*  43.35**  -5.460*  -11.44 
  (-1.698)  (2.692)  (-1.869)  (0.340)  (-1.863)  (2.642)  (-1.857)  (-0.0967) 
Distance OECD (log)  -4.657*  3.191  -14.69***  -57.40  -4.423*  2.312  -14.64***  -80.73 
  (-1.729)  (0.204)  (-3.731)  (-0.468)  (-1.716)  (0.139)  (-3.532)  (-0.632) 
lc100km  7.836***  3.735  8.368***  258.3***  7.881***  3.124  8.315***  249.4*** 
  (5.590)  (0.449)  (3.756)  (3.821)  (5.430)  (0.378)  (3.709)  (3.733) 
Common language OECD  -1.429  -4.692  1.086  -45.06  -1.676  -4.286  1.078  -55.65 
  (-0.689)  (-0.533)  (0.814)  (-0.360)  (-0.785)  (-0.475)  (0.798)  (-0.415) 
Constant  40.63  -108.9  92.79*  949.0  26.26  -108.5  87.23*  606.0 
  (1.086)  (-0.581)  (1.952)  (0.679)  (0.699)  (-0.521)  (1.705)  (0.423) 
                 
Control variables included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  82  82  82  82  81  81  81  81 
R²  0.581  0.705  0.655  0.494  0.598  0.703  0.657  0.499 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. R : Remittances in percentage of GDP ; FD : private credit ratio ; M : Emigration rates of individuals aged 
25+ to OECD ; Information : binary variable on the existence of public (i.e., government-owned) and private credit registries (Djankov et al., 2007) ; 
Distance OECD : The log of the distance between the departure point and the OECD area; Common language OECD : binary variable which takes the 
value one if the country shares the same language with at least one member of OECD; lc100km : Ratio of coastal area (area within 100km of 








Table 4 : Instrumentation equations related to the estimation of model (2) 
Variables  R  FD  M  R*Sh 
(5years) 
R  FD  M  R*Sh 
(10years) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
Volatility(5 years)  0.105  5.135  0.144  0.391         
  (0.134)  (0.485)  (0.151)  (0.119)         
Dual exchange*Volatility (5year)  -0.199  -0.0976  -0.273  -1.249         
  (-0.323)  (-0.0202)  (-0.377)  (-0.505)         
Cost $200*Volatility (5years)  -0.00860  -0.385  -0.0250  0.293         
  (-0.155)  (-0.565)  (-0.343)  (0.992)         
Information  0.488  0.452  -1.170  0.227  0.443  0.261  -1.021  -7.726 
  (0.463)  (0.0575)  (-0.606)  (0.0472)  (0.404)  (0.0334)  (-0.491)  (-0.801) 
Creditors’ right  -0.0635  6.233***  0.266  0.616  -0.106  6.648***  0.302  -0.126 
  (-0.179)  (2.728)  (0.523)  (0.445)  (-0.280)  (3.031)  (0.554)  (-0.0429) 
lc100km  7.539***  2.613  8.746***  18.50**  7.448***  2.838  8.667***  43.34*** 
  (5.080)  (0.275)  (3.940)  (2.276)  (5.109)  (0.270)  (3.671)  (3.601) 
Distance OECD (log)  -4.247  -12.22  -14.08***  -20.24  -4.365  -11.87  -14.40***  -34.51 
  (-1.597)  (-0.742)  (-3.662)  (-1.476)  (-1.639)  (-0.622)  (-3.674)  (-1.334) 
Common language OECD  -1.159  -0.691  0.774  -3.110  -1.357  -1.864  0.921  -17.30 
  (-0.554)  (-0.0732)  (0.619)  (-0.358)  (-0.621)  (-0.191)  (0.738)  (-1.015) 
Dual exchange rates  -0.0240  -18.55  0.841  -2.980  0.384  -21.72  1.305  -6.985 
  (-0.0114)  (-1.293)  (0.282)  (-0.340)  (0.154)  (-1.579)  (0.353)  (-0.303) 
Cost to send $200  0.0512  -1.517  0.451  -0.647  -0.0163  -1.821  0.424  -2.373 
  (0.232)  (-0.681)  (0.994)  (-0.897)  (-0.0621)  (-0.983)  (0.851)  (-0.929) 
Volatility (10 years)          -0.00524  3.016  0.164  -5.775 
          (-0.00687)  (0.525)  (0.161)  (-0.616) 
Dual exchange*Volatility (10years)          -0.252  0.620  -0.311  -1.131 
          (-0.533)  (0.232)  (-0.496)  (-0.276) 
Cost $200*Volatility (10years)          0.0117  -0.239  -0.0152  0.780 
          (0.196)  (-0.553)  (-0.206)  (1.109) 
Constant  26.23  75.22  87.16*  4.651  21.21  85.80  90.60*  168.7 
  (0.676)  (0.355)  (1.968)  (0.0268)  (0.553)  (0.349)  (1.981)  (0.405) 
                 
Control variables included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  82  82  82  82  81  81  81  81 
R²  0.557  0.634  0.609  0.545  0.570  0.628  0.606  0.584 
Note: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. R : Remittances in percentage of GDP ; FD : private credit ratio ; M : Emigration rates of individuals aged 25+ to 
OECD ; Information : binary variable on the existence of public (i.e., government-owned) and private credit registries (Djankov et al. [2007]) ; Distance 
OECD : The log of the distance between the departure point and the OECD area; Common language OECD : binary variable which takes the value one if the 
country shares the same language with at least one member of OECD; lc100km : Ratio of coastal area (area within 100km of sea/ocean ) to total area; Sh 
(5years): Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate in previous 5 years; Sh (10years): Standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate in previous 
10 years. All the control variables as well as regional dummies are included in all specifications.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 